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Abstract 
 
By using a simultaneous equations model, this paper establishes that the perceived quality of 
governance, which is measured by three different indicators “Quality of Administration”, “Public 
Accountability” and “Political Stability”, has a positive effect on the private investment 
decisions in the developing countries. Our model allows us to point out the fact that the 
mechanisms through which each type of indicator affects private investment are different.  In 
addition to our primary result we also show that Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
could have attained a better private investment performance if it had reached a more advanced 
level of perceived institutions in last two decades. The low level of public accountability, among 
other governance deficiencies, was predominantly responsible for the deficiency in private 
investment in MENA.   
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1. Introduction 
The quality of governance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is 
generally considered to be inadequate. Although this is true for a large number of institutions, 
quality of governance is a wide-ranging phenomenon and its distinct features may exhibit quite 
different paths for the same region (see Table I). For example in terms of the administrative 
quality and political stability indicators used in this paper, MENA ranks third in average during 
1980 to 2002-with scores of 0.14 and 0.07 respectively- among the six developing regions and is 
superior to Africa (AFR), Latin America (LAC) and South Asia (SAS). This basic comparison 
shows that contrary to common belief, MENA is not particularly deficient in institutional quality 
when measured by these indicators. On the other hand political accountability for the MENA is 
the lowest among the regions with the score of -0.901. The different levels of advancement 
displayed by the various governance indicators in the MENA region (as well as other regions) 
suggest that the mechanisms shaping each indicator can be quite different. Hence these different 
types of governance institutions are also expected to exert their influences on the economic 
variables differently as well. So, in this paper we focus on the various different dimensions of 
governance indicators and analyze the impact of various types of perceived governance 
institutions on the level of private investment in MENA. 
There is an emerging literature on the quality of governance which advocates that “good” 
governance institutions are needed for successful market-based economies2. The impact of 
institutions on economic growth3 , GDP per capita4 and or volatility of the economic activity5 
have been studied extensively in the recent years. Although private investment is one of the main 
channels through which institutions exert their influence on growth and economic development, 
very little research is done on the relationship between private investment and governance 
institutions. The existing studies on governance and private investment have generally 
concentrated on the effect of the rule of law6. Private investment is very much responsive to the 
changes in the business environment; which governance constitutes an important element. The 
forward looking nature of investment highlights the importance of a stable and secure 
environment. World Bank (2004) finds a strong positive link between the investment climate and 
private investment decisions and suggests that better governance improves the investment 
climate by improving bureaucratic performances and predictability which in turn reduced 
uncertainty and the cost of doing business.  
Since governance is an important determinant for investment, private investors would 
want to know about the quality of the governance institutions at the time of making investment 
decisions but they may not know the actual governance establishments with 100% accuracy. 
Hence they collect information about the quality of governance institutions from various sources 
                                                 
1
 Table II, also confirms the same result .The level of the variables associated with administrative quality and 
political stability look rather satisfactory for the MENA region. In contrast, in terms of political accountability 
variables –civil liberties and government stability- MENA has the lowest score among all the regions. 
2
 See in particular Rodrik (1999) and Frankel (2002). 
3
 See for example Knack and Keefer (1995) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) among others. 
4
 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) among others.  
5
 See for example Acemoglu and Taicharoen (2003). 
6
 Under this category the security of the property rights is the most studied and empirically validated component. 
See North (1981) and Knack and Keefer (1995)    
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to form their perceptions about these institutions. Since their opinions on governance institutions 
are crucial in making the investment decisions, perceived level of quality of the governance 
institutions needs to be analyzed as a determinant of private investment. For the governance 
variables we use the data obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Freedom 
House (FH). These are independent private firms that provide consulting services to international 
investors. We argue that, this data set can be a good proxy to measure the perceptions of the 
investors about the institutions. We also allow for the possibility that perceived and actual 
institutions may actually differ. Based on the existing literature, we classify governance 
institutions in three groups as “Administrative Quality”, “Political Stability” and “Political 
Accountability”. The first one, Administrative Quality contains four variables from the ICRG: 
“Control over Corruption”, “Quality of Bureaucracy”, “Investment Profile”, and “Law and 
Order”7.This governance unit shows the capacity of the government to provide investment-
friendly and reliable conditions for the private investors. Political Stability is composed of the 
following four variables from ICRG: “Government Stability”, “Internal Conflict”, “External 
Conflict” and “Ethnic Tensions”. The lack of Political stability creates uncertainty which has 
detrimental effects for the level of investment. Our last indicator, Public Accountability consists 
of two indicators from FH: “Civil Liberties” and “Political Rights”. Private investment decisions 
are highly sensitive to the perception of the credibility and persistence of the political regime, as 
well as of policies (See Rodrik 1991). A participatory political system provides the stability of 
social institutions and ensures a broad public support to policies, which are in this case more 
sustainable in the long run. 
 The neoclassical flexible accelerator model (Jorgenson, 1963) is based on the 
neoclassical idea of the theory of the firm. The determinants of investment in the neoclassical 
flexible accelerator model include the expected aggregate demand (the accelerator), the user cost 
of capital, the wage rate and the initial capital stock. The firms in developing countries face 
certain constraints that are not accounted for in the conventional neoclassical theory8. One of the 
main constraints confronted by the investors in the developing countries is the deficit in 
economic reforms. Structural reforms are important determinants of the actual and future 
profitability of private investment. Our structural reforms index includes trade policy and 
financial development. Financial development is an important determinant for private investment 
since it creates profitable investment opportunities. A developed financial system mobilizes and 
allocates resources to the projects that will create the most surplus. Trade reforms can also 
encourage private investment decisions. The link between persistent growth and trade openness 
is generally acknowledged (See Bisat et. al., 1996). In addition to their direct effects; economic 
reforms are also expected to affect private investment through their impact on institutional 
quality. For example, there is some evidence that greater openness to trade and stronger 
competition are conducive to institutional improvement (Berg and Krueger 2003). Human capital 
is also an important determinant for the level of private investment. Human capital stimulates 
private capital formation by raising the profitability of investment and can provide positive 
externalities (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). Additionally, human capital gives rise to 
institutions with better quality. More educated people with higher life expectancy become more 
competent bureaucrats demand for better quality of bureaucracy (Galor et al., 2005). In the 
                                                 
7
 These four variables (as well as the components of the other two groups) are aggregated using the Principle 
Components Analysis to form a broad index for the Quality of Administration. 
8
 See in particular Shafik (1992), and Aysan, Pang and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) for a discussion and 
additional references. 
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developing countries, the government is still the pre-dominant actor in the economy. Hence the 
level of government consumption can be an important determinant for private investment for 
these countries. When government spending is used to finance projects which increase the 
profitability of the private investment (like health and education services) then the effect of this 
factor on private investment will be positive. On the flip side government consumption can 
reduce the amount of funds available to the private sector. This effect is most likely to be 
observed through the increase in the interest rates (Binter 1977) and future tax burden (Friedman 
1976). Since government consumption can have beneficial as well as damaging effects on the 
private investment in theory, the overall impact of this variable on the level of private investment 
needs to be analyzed empirically. Government spending is expected to have a positive effect on 
governance. For example the improvements in the living standards of the bureaucrats caused by 
the increase in wages can induce them to form better governance institutions. 9 
Aysan, Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) have reexamined and updated the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) data set for private investment by consulting the 
national sources, IMF and World Bank series and country economists. We use their disseminated 
data set (which covers the period from 1970 to 2002 and includes 60 developing countries) in our 
study. Private investment and different forms of governance institutions are jointly determined so 
we use a simultaneous equations model. The procedure of this model is justified by the fact that 
private investment can have a direct effect on the institutions10. Our findings show that the 
perceived quality of governance institutions plays an important role in private investment 
decisions. “Administrative Quality” (QA) and “Political Stability” (PS) and “Political 
accountability” (PA) are crucial for the determination of private investment. This result supports 
the hypothesis that different categories of governance institutions effect private investment 
through different channels. 
 
2. The Econometric Analysis 
 
2.1. The Model Tested 
In our empirical model, endogenous variables are the share of private investment and the 
various measures of governance, namely Quality of Administration (QA), Political 
Accountability (PA) and Political Stability (PS). To incorporate the two-way causality into our 
analysis, we form a system of equations to estimate the share of private investment (PI) in GDP 
and quality of governance institutions (IQ) simultaneously. In the private investment equation, 
perceived quality of governance institutions is expected to increase the private investment. In the 
governance equation, the sign of the coefficient of private investment is expected to be positive. 
This system of equations is estimated using three stage least squares by controlling for the other 
determinants. The model estimated is the following: 
                                           itiitit XIQPI 11210 εααα +++=        (A) 
                                                 
9
 See Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) 
10
 For instance, an increase in the private investment strengthens the private sector’ incentive in lobbying .Hence 
these newly-empowered corporate bodies are likely to exert more pressure on the government and demand 
institutional changes for their own well-being, see Altmann (2006). 
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                                                      itiitit XPIIQ 22210 εββγ +++=         (B) 
In these equations, itPI  is the share of private investment in GDP and itIQ  represents the 
various indexes of governance (QA, PA and PS). iX 1  And iX 2  are the other control variables in 
private investment (PI) and governance (IQ) equations respectively. it1ε  and it2ε  are the error 
terms of each equation. i  signifies the country and t  represents the time of the variable. 
The private investment equation in our model includes real interest rate (Realr) to capture 
the user cost of capital and the GDP growth rate in last year (Growth) to account for the 
accelerator effect11. These two variables are assumed to have no direct effect on the level of the 
perceived quality of governance so are not included in the governance equations. The following 
variables appear in both of the equations. GDP per capita variable enters in the private 
investment with an expected negative sign. This variable in the governance equation is expected 
to exert a positive influence on the governance indicators12.Our Structural reforms (SR) index is 
composed by aggregating trade policy and financial development indicator by using the principal 
component analysis. Financial development is calculated by the private credit by banks and other 
depository institutions. Trade policy indicator is formed by subtracting the exports of oil and 
mining products and the “natural trade openness” (Constructed by Sachs and Warner 1997) from 
the commercial openness (Calculated by aggregating the export and import in total GDP ). 
Structural reform is expected to enhance the level of private investment and the perceived quality 
of the governance institutions. Human Capital (HC) index is formed by aggregating life 
expectancy at birth and average years of primary, secondary and higher schooling variables. The 
ratio of government consumption to GDP (GCons) is used to account for the level of government 
consumption and this variable is included in both of the equations. The effect of this variable on 
private investment is not certain ex-ante, but it is expected to exert a positive influence on the 
governance equations. Oil export as a percentage of total merchandise export (Oil Export) is also 
included as explanatory variables in both equations. The validity of the natural curse hypothesis 
is tested by incorporating this variable in the investment equation13 and the sign of this variable 
in the private investment equation is expected to be negative. The share of oil exports has also 
implications for the quality of governance institutions in the economy14 so, oil export as a 
percentage of total merchandise export is expected to have a negative coefficient in the 
governance equations.  
The tenure of the system (Tensys) from Keefer et al. (2001) is excluded from the 
investment equation to identify the system and is expected to have a positive influence on the 
governance institutions15. Finally, a regional dummy for the Middle Eastern and North African 
countries (MENA dummy) appears as a right hand side variable in both of the equations.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 GDP growth rate enters the equation with an expected positive sign whereas the effect of the real interest rate is 
expected to be negative. 
12
  According to more Azariadis and Lahiri (2002) developed countries can afford to have better institutions. 
13
 When a country relies more on natural resources extraction in its export, there can be less incentives to invest for 
other products, Rodriguez and Sachs (1999). 
14
 Countries which are less dependent on natural resources are expected to form better governance institutions , see  
Ross (2001). 
15
 Tenure system reports the number of years that an administrative system lasts in the country. 
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2.2. Estimation Results 
Equations “(A)” and “(B)” have been estimated on an unbalanced panel of 32 developing 
countries over 1970-2002. Three sets of regressions have been calculated, each one utilizing a 
different governance indicator to account for the perceived quality of the government 
institutions. Tables IV present the results. 
From table IV column 1-where Administration Quality (QA) is used as a measure of 
governance- we can conclude that the QA has a positive and significant coefficient at the 5 % 
level in the investment equation. In this specification especially the structural reforms have an 
important impact on private investment. The accelerator variable has the expected positive sign 
and it is significant. Although not significant, interest rate appears to exert a negative effect on 
the private investment, which is consistent with the user cost of capital theory.  The coefficient of 
the GDP per capita and human capital variables are not significant. Government consumption 
variable has a significantly negative coefficient in equation 1 (Table IV column 1). This finding 
indicates that, for the countries that are included in our sample the crowding out effect of 
government spending outweighs the crowding in effect. The coefficient of the oil export variable 
as a percentage of total merchandise export is significant and negative in equation 1. Similarly, 
the regional dummy for MENA countries has a negative coefficient. MENA countries seem to be 
diverging from the rest of the world in terms of private investment. However, this dummy 
variable is not significant. This result is most likely stem from the inclusion of the oil exports 
variable in the regressions. On the “Administrative Quality” equation (Table IV, column 2), our 
results uncover the positive influence of several factors on the perceived quality of the 
administration. For example GDP per capita-although small- has a significantly positive 
coefficient which implies that countries with superior resources are able to develop better 
institutions. Besides, private investment helps improving the administrative quality considerably. 
This last result validates the usage of the 3SLSQ estimation technique. Tenure of system is also 
an important determinant for the administrative quality. Government spending has a significantly 
positive coefficient for the administration quality. Our estimations fail to confirm the negative 
impact of the share of oil export in merchandise export. Structural reforms and human capital are 
not significant in explaining administrative quality in equation (2). However, when estimating 
the system by excluding private investment from equation (B), the coefficient of the structural 
reforms and human capital becomes positive and highly significant (see Table IV column 4). 
This result seems to be due to the fact that the structural reforms index is correlated with private 
investment. Hence, the positive impact of private investment on administrative quality seems 
mainly due to the structural reforms which stimulate firms’ decisions to invest. This result also 
shows that the impact of human capital on private investment is indirect. 
Political Stability (see columns 5&6 of Table IV) seems to have a significant and positive 
impact on the investment decisions, but for this governance indicator the level of significance is 
10%. Once again structural reforms are confirmed to be crucial for private investment, but this 
time their effect is indirect. They enhance the level of investment by improving the political 
stability of a country (see Table IV columns 5&6). In this specification, both of the variables that 
are related to the neo-classical investment model- growth and interest rate- are highly significant 
with the expected signs.  The influence of human capital on the political stability is highly 
significant. Hence we can say that the human capital variable is exerting its influence on private 
investment through its influence on political stability. Similar to the   Administrative Quality 
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case, we are again able to verify the natural curse hypothesis. But the effect of private investment 
is not significant on political stability. The regional MENA dummy in the political stability 
equation (Table IV column 6) is significant with a positive sign. This result establishes a strong 
conclusion about the level of the quality of the governance in the MENA region as measured by 
the political stability indicator. Controlling for the other determinants of the political stability, 
being a MENA country increases the level of stability. Unlike the administrative quality case, 
government consumption does not have a robust effect on political stability (Table IV, column 
6). Also the positive impact of GDP and Tenure system on political stability are validated in this 
specification.  
Table IV (columns 7&8) reports the regression results when “Political Accountability” 
measures the perceived quality of institutions. We show that the coefficient of Political 
Accountability in the private investment equation (See table IV equation 7) is significant at the 
10% level. This can be viewed as an important contribution to the literature on economic activity 
and democracy.  This set of estimations also confirms that structural reforms encourage private 
investment decisions. This time, the link appears to be only direct, the coefficient of the 
structural reforms indicator in the political accountability equation appears insignificant (Table 
IV, columns 7&8). Like the political stability case human capital has a significant influence on 
the political accountability but not on private investment. Unlike the previous indicators the 
MENA dummy variable has different coefficients in both of the equations. In equation (7), the 
coefficient of the MENA dummy is positive, although not significant. On the political 
accountability equation (Table IV, columns 8) the coefficient of this variable is now significant 
and negative. This last finding strengthens our claims about the low level of democratic quality 
in the MENA region introduced in the first section. Once again both of the variables that are 
related to the neo-classical investment model are highly significant with the expected signs. Like 
the previous cases crowding out effect of the government sector spending on private investment 
and the positive influence of government consumption on the quality of institutions is established 
in this specification too (Table IV, columns 7&8). Finally like the previous two indicators, this 
one also verifies the natural curse hypothesis along with the positive influence of the level of 
GDP on governance.  
 
3. Perceived Quality of Governance and Private Investment Performance of MENA 
In this section, we use the models estimated previously to uncover the contribution of 
each type of governance institution to the improvement of private investment performance in the 
MENA region. For this purpose, we compare private investment performance of the MENA 
region in these respects to the one of the more advanced developing economies of our sample, 
the East Asian economies and simulate which level of private investment MENA could have 
achieved if the region had the same perceived governance institutions as East Asia. This is done 
for two time periods; the 1980s and the 1990s respectively. In our simulations we use the 
equations obtained for private investment in the three different specifications. (See Table IV, 
columns 1, 5 and 7). The contribution of the Quality of Administration index has been calculated 
by aggregating the contributions of its four sub-components and the same thing has been done 
for the other governance indicators.16 
                                                 
16
 See Annex 2 and Annex 3. For more details on the methodology, see Nagaraj et al. (2000). 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.02 
 
 9 
 From Table V (top section) it can be seen that, if MENA had the same perceived quality 
of administration as the East Asia in the 1980s it’s average-private investment to GDP ratio 
would have reached 13.8 (compared to 11.9 per cent observed).When the contributions of the 
various components of administration quality  to this result are examined, it becomes clear that 
deficiencies in the investment profile and law &order were the primary reasons for the gap 
between the actual and potential level of private investment (these two components are 
responsible for the loss of 0.6 and 0.8 points of private investment to GDP respectively). These 
results imply that, in the 1980s the countries in the MENA region had difficulties in ensuring an 
equitable and consistent rule of law in protecting the security rights, as well as providing an 
investment environment that is free from risks to operations and excessive regulations. Table VI 
shows that in the 1980s, private investment in the MENA region had the potential to reach on 
average 15.9 per cent of GDP if the gap with the East Asian institutions in terms of political 
stability was diminished. External and internal stability components were nearly the sole 
contributors to this result which have reduced private investment decisions by respectively 1.6 
and 2.7 per cent of GDP on average per year If MENA had benefited from the same quality 
political accountability private investment would have been 15.9 percent of GDP in the 1980s 
(See table VII). The lack of civil liberties and political rights has both been important factors in 
keeping the region from reaching its potential level of investment. 
In the 1990s, the gap with East Asia has been noticeably reduced in terms of 
“Administrative Quality” and “Political Stability”. The deficit in private investment caused by 
insufficient quality of administration was 0.4 points of GDP on average per year in the 1990s 
(see Table V bottom section). The gap with East Asia has nearly fully diminished in terms of 
corruption, investment profile and law&order. On the other hand just like the 1980s lack of 
bureaucratic quality is still responsible for the loss the private investment equaling to 0.3 points 
of GDP on average. In the 1990s, MENA had a superior performance –in terms of the overall 
political stability indicator- than the East Asia in terms of political stability (see Table VI). 
Government stability and ethnic tension sub-components are better for the MENA region, 
whereas- although improved significantly compared to the 1980- external conflict still accounts 
for the loss of 0.3 points of private investment to GDP. In terms of Political Accountability, the 
gap between the two regions nearly did not decrease at all. The low level of political 
accountability is responsible for the deficit in private investment equaling to 3.9 points of GDP 
(See Table VII). 
4. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we empirically show that the perceived quality of governance is an 
important determinant of the private investment decisions in the developing countries by 
stressing the existence of different types of possible measures of governance. Different types of 
governance; namely “Quality of Administration” (QA), “Political Accountability” (PA) and 
“Political Stability” (PS) are confirmed to exert their influence on the private investment through 
diverse mechanisms. All of the three indicators were proved to be significantly –although at 
different levels of significance and magnitudes of influence-important for private investment 
decisions. The weakness of MENA institutions during the 1980s was an important reason for the 
observed low level of investment in this region. In the 1990s the gap between the two regions 
mostly diminished in terms of the quality of the administration and political stability. On the 
other hand the gap between the MENA and East Asia regions did not decrease at all in terms of 
the political accountability.  The low level of perceived PA was still responsible for the deficit in 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2008.02 
 
 10 
private investment equaling to 3.9 points of GDP. These results support the argument that 
governance may exert different levels of influence on private investment when measured by 
different indicators.  
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Annex 1 
 
Table I: Governance Indicators (average 1970-2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II: Disaggregated Governance Variables (average 1970-2002) 
 
 
 
Table III: List of Countries with High Quality Data (60 countries) 
 
 
Argentina, Bangladesh*, Barbados*, Belize, Benin*, Bolivia*, Brazil*, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile*, 
China*, Colombia*,Comoros, Costa Rica*, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Rep., Ecuador*, Egypt 
Arab Rep.*, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala*, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras*, 
India*, Indonesia*, Iran Islamic Rep., Kenya*, Lithuania, Malawi*, Malaysia*, Mauritius*, Mexico, 
Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan*, Panama, Papua New Guinea*, Paraguay*, Peru*, Philippines*, 
Poland*, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, South Africa*, St. LuciaSt., Vincent and the 
Grenadines , Thailand*, Trinidad & Tobago*, Tunisia*, Turkey*, Uruguay*, Uzbekistan, Venezuela*, 
Yugoslavia (FR)  
 
Due to the lack of corresponding data for some countries, only counties marked with * are included in the 
final regressions 
 
 
 
Region 
Administrative 
Quality  
Political 
Stability  
Political 
Accountability  
AFR  -0.38 -0.63 -0.55 
EAP 0.59 0.29 -0.05 
ECA 0.29 0.42 0.03 
LAC -0.31 -0.09 1.16 
MENA 0.14 0.07 -0.90 
SAS -0.55 -0.88 0.46 
Sources: International Country Risk Guide, Freedom House, and the Authors’ 
calculations. 
Region Corruption 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
Investment 
Profile 
Law 
and 
Order 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Government 
Stability  
Internal 
Conflict  
External 
Conflict 
Ethnic 
Tensions  
AFR  2.81 1.49 5.42 2.71 -5.10 -4.97 6.07 6.96 8.44 2.99 
EAP 3.22 2.37 6.29 3.89 -4.29 -4.49 7.07 9.28 9.99 3.33 
ECA 3.43 1.71 5.69 4.04 -4.20 -4.39 6.94 9.68 10.06 3.92 
LAC 2.71 1.44 5.73 2.81 -2.72 -3.02 6.13 7.61 9.75 4.34 
MENA 2.98 1.95 5.89 3.39 -5.41 -5.51 7.62 8.30 8.34 4.34 
SAS 1.98 1.81 5.38 2.33 -3.38 -4.08 5.73 6.60 8.27 2.29 
Sources: International Country Risk Guide, Freedom House the Authors’ calculations. 
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Table IV: Estimation Results 
 
  Endogenous Variables Endogenous Variables Endogenous Variables Endogenous Variables 
Explanatory  Priv inv QA Priv inv QA Priv inv PS Priv inv PA 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
                
QA 2.07       2.16  
 
 
 
 
      (2.08)**      (2.17)**  
 
 
 
 
PS           3.64    
         (1.72)*    
PA       4.74  
        (1.66)* 
GCons -0.27       0.07 -0.26      0.04 -0.20 -0.01 -0.44 0.05 
       (-3.35)***    (4.07)***       (-3.36)***     (3.81)***           (-2.52)**   (-0.49)    (-2.45)**    (2.55)** 
Priv Inv        0.12          -.07  -0.05 
     (2.53)**        (-1.59)  (-0.87) 
SR 1.71   -0.0018         1.73      0.3       1.11       0.53 3.53 -0.13 
        (5.24)***     (-0.01)       (5.28)***                            (9.11)*** (1.51)    (4.36)***          (4.66)***       (-0.98) 
HC 0.25        0.05         0.2      0.09 -0.42       0.25 -0.71 0.25 
  
       (1) (0.95)       (0.79) 
   (2.47)** (-0.76)    (5.32)**        (-1.00)       (4.70)*** 
Oil Export 
 
-0.03      0.0025 -0.04     -0.0025 -0.05 -0.001 -0.06 0.001 
  
     (-2.96)***  (0.85)       (-3.28)***    (-1.41)      (-3.02)*** (-0.25)      (-3.06)*** (0.33) 
GDP per 
capita       0.00009     0.0007     0.00018 0.0001    -0.00002 0.0002   -0.0008 0.0003 
  
       (0.38) 
  (1.80)*       (0.73)   (3.12)***      (-0.06)    (3.90)***      (-0.95)   (5.64)*** 
MENA 
Dummy -0.97 0.13 -0.83       0.02 -2.19      .34 4.47       -1.15 
  
(-0.99) (0.67) (-0.86)      (0.15)  (-1.64) (1.81)* (1.25)    (-5.27)*** 
Rear -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  -0.04  
  
(-1.53)  
     (-3.18)***     (-2.47)**       (-2.86)***  
Growth       0.19          0.16         0.19  0.23  
     (2.77)***      (2.13)**     (2.53)**       (2.77)***  
Ten Syst  0.01       0.02        0.013  0.01 
  
 
     (3.55)***   (6.21)***     (3.66)***        (2.29)*** 
Constant      15.5 -2.84 15.62      -1.03 16.96 -0.02 17.35 -0.25 
      (10.13)***     (-3.85)***      (10.16)***  (-6.65)***    (7.09)*** (-0.02)     (6.80)*** (-0.30) 
Num obs 349 in each equation 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. 
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Table V: Private Investment to GDP – Administrative Quality (QA) Case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI: Private Investment to GDP – Political Stability Case (PS) Case 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII: Private Investment to GDP – Political Accountability (PA) Case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Increase with an improvement in  
  
Priv. Invest. 
(Actual) QA Corruption 
Bur. 
Qual. Invest.Prof. 
Law& 
Order 
Priv Invest. 
(Potential) 
1980 11.9 1.9     13.8 
 
  0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8  
 
       
1990 11.6 0.4     12.0 
  
  0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  Increase with an improvement in  
  
Priv. Invest. 
(Actual) PS Gov. Stab. 
Int. 
Confl. Ext. Confl. Ethn. Tens. 
Priv Invest. 
(Potential) 
1980 11.9 4.0     15.9 
 
  0.1 1.6 2.7 -0.4  
 
       
1990 11.6 -0.7     10,9 
  
  -0.6 0.1 0.3 -0.5  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Private Investment to GDP – Political Accountability (PA) Case 
  
Increase with an improvement in  
  
 
Priv. Invest. 
(Actual) PA Pol. Rights Civ. Lib. 
Priv Invest. 
(Potential) 
1980 11.9 4.0   15.9 
 
  1.9 2.1 
 
 
  
   
1990 11.6 4.0   15.6 
   
1.9 2.1 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Annex 2 
 
Principal Component Analysis: To get the overall impact of the changes in each category 
of the governance indicators, we first calculated the contribution of each initial variable 
in the category to the overall improvement in the level of private investment. The 
calculation is based on the estimated coefficients of each type of governance indicator in 
the regression (Table IV, equations 1,5 and 7)  as well as on the weights of each principal 
component in the aggregate indicator combined with the loading of the initial variables in 
each principal component . 
 
Figure 1: The Administrative Quality Indicator 
 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
P1 2.23 0.56  
P2 0.83 0.76  
P3 0.51 0.89  
P4 0.43 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 
Corruption 0.49 -0.57 0.06 0.65 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.54 -0.08 0.64 -0.54 
Investment profile 0.41 0.81 0.08 0.40 
Law and Order 0.54 -0.02 -0.76 -0.36 
 
QA = P1*(0.5577/0.7640) + P2*(0.2063/0.7640) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Political Stability Indicator 
 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
P1 2.96 0.42  
P2 0.97 0.56  
P3 0.90 0.69  
P4 0.68 0.79  
P5 0.62 0.88  
P6 0.57 0.96  
P7 0.30 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 
Gov Stability) 0.32 -0.62 -0.38 0.05 
Socioeco Conditions 0.29 0.63 -0.44 -0.14 
Internal Conflicts  0.51 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 
External Conflicts  0.39 -0.29 0.26 -0.6 
Ethnic Tensions 0.39 -0.06 0.02 0.77 
Religious Tensions 0.31 0.19 0.76 0.1 
Military in Politics 0.39 0.31 -0.12 -0.11 
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PS = P1* (0.4253/ 0.7878) + P2* (0.1373/0.7878) + P3* (0.1280/ 0.7878 + P4* (0.0972/ 0.7878) 
 
 
Figure 3: The Political Accountability Indicator 
 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
P1 1.88 0.94  
P2 0.12 1  
 
 
 Loadings P1 P2 
 Political Rights  0.71 0.71 
 Civil Liberties 0.71 -0.71 
 
PA = P1 
 
 
 
Annex 3 
 
Figure 4: Short term coefficients of the Disaggregated  Indicators 
 
Short and Long Term Coefficients/Elasticities 
  
    
  
Short Term Coefficients 
Standardized Level 
Index Variables 
Variables Variables 
Corruption 0,43 0,40 
bureaucraty quality 0,78 0,75 
QA 
investment profile* 1,08 0,51 
 law and order 0,80 0,62 
        
Government 
Stability  
1,81 0,75 PS 
Internal Conflict  1,56 0,60 
 External Conflict 1,49 0,67 
 
Ethnic Tensions  0,67 0,46 
       
Political rights 3,37 1,70 
Civil liberties 3,37 2,10 
PA 
      
 
